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THE CURRENT STATE AND PROBLEMS OF 
ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA† 
DR. CHEN LIJIE* 
In order to ensure the normal operations of a market economy China 
must build and maintain an efficient competition policy. The purpose of 
such a policy is to protect and promote market competition and price-
system efficiency. The task is law-related. Whatever agency is created 
must obey and enforce the law. The foundations of this policy are 
efficient, competitive markets and sufficiently and consistently interrelated 
laws and regulations with particular emphasis on anti-monopoly law. 
These foundations are required, a fortiori, in countries transforming from 
planned to market economy systems.  
Presently, China has no anti-monopoly law; however, provisions 
controlling monopolies and anticompetitive acts are distributed among 
different laws, rules, and regulations.1 Although these laws are scattered, 
they indicate the emergence of China’s competition law. In response to the 
recently drafted Anti-Monopoly Law (“the Law”) I would like now to 
discuss the legislation’s character and potential problems.2 
I. DEFINITION OF MONOPOLY 
There exists a primary problem in defining the term “monopoly”: the 
term is relative to the scale of adjustment created by the anti-monopoly 
law. There are two opinions about the definition and its policy 
consequences. The first opinion is that “monopoly” refers primarily to 
economic monopoly and China’s legislation should adapt itself to 
internationalization. According to this first opinion, administrative 
monopolies are unique occurrences arising during the period of system 
 
 
 † Due to circumstances beyond the Law Review’s control, we have relied on the integrity of 
the Author for facts asserted here in that are not supported by a citation. 
 * Deputy Director of the Department of Economic and Regulation’s State of Economic and 
Trade Commission. 
 1. The provisions are primarily contained within the Price Law, Unfair Competition Law, Bid 
Invitation and Bidding Law, Provisions of the State Council on Prohibition of Imposition of Regional 
Blockade on Market Economic Activities, which prohibits the abuse of dominant market positions, 
agreements that restrict competition, regional monopolies, and sectional monopolies. 
 2. The Anti-Monopoly Law was drafted according to the plan of the Ninth Standing Committee 
of the People’s National Congress, the State Economic and Trade Commission, and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce 
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transformation, and these problems can be solved merely through the 
addition of relative rules and without being newly redefined. The other 
opinion maintains that administrative monopoly is the main form present, 
and therefore, must be specially defined and regulated in the draft law. In 
addition, opinions differ as to how the term should be defined in the Law. 
Some advocate a highly formal, logical definition in order to make the 
term clear, definite, concrete, and perspicuous.3 Others proffer a pragmatic 
definition based on experience and formations used by Western market 
countries. These people suggest that the Law enumerate various kinds of 
monopolistic acts. 
In my opinion, we should consider the following facts and factors when 
defining monopoly. First, because there is no universal definition of 
monopoly China has no authoritative model to use as reference. Second, 
strong national characteristics impact the formation of the term. For 
example, America uses the term “Antitrust,” Germany uses the term 
“Anticartel,” and Japan uses the term “Anti-private monopoly,” so it is 
difficult to follow their examples. Third, the term’s meaning will be 
shaped by and reflect current economic development within the country. 
To explain, legislators and administrators consider scale economy, 
economic trends, and international market share in their characterization of 
monopolies; moreover, this characterization changes as the scale, trends, 
and international market shares develop over time. Finally, China’s unique 
regulations on imports will also be a factor in the definition of monopoly. 
Because of China’s current economic state and in accordance with the 
definition of monopoly in most countries, China should adopt as its 
definition a list. This list should include: monopoly agreement, abuse of 
the market dominant position, over-concentration of enterprises, and the 
abuse of administrative power to exclude, restrain competition, and 
damage the interest of consumers, business operations and the public. 
II. THE SCOPE OF ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW’S APPLICATION 
A scientific and reasonable scale of China’s anti-monopoly law 
requires hard work and the determination of three issues or concerns. First, 
we must ask whether the law shall apply to all kinds of monopoly, 
including economic monopoly. Second, whether sectors involving natural 
monopolies and public interests shall be exempted in order to avoid 
wasting social resources such transportation, telecommunications, energy, 
 
 
 3. Examples of highly formal definitions include the term “offense” as it operates in Chinese 
criminal law, the term “civil law”, and the term “contract” in Chinese contract law. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/6
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and public facilities like water and waste treatment.4 Third, whether 
national anti-monopoly law can work effectively internationally. 
Because of China’s unique economic state and the lessons drawn from 
international legislation, the anti-monopoly law should first involve 
administrative monopolies, government’s abuse of power at the expense to 
competitive markets. Additionally, as scientific technology and 
productivity develop, there is a tendency to narrow the exceptions for 
natural monopolies. For instance, the natural monopolies traditionally 
allocated to energy, telecommunications, and transportation providers 
have, in recent years, been replaced with more competitive systems. The 
natural monopolies have lost their control over these sectors as new 
competitors have been allowed to enter the market. This is not to say that 
all acts of natural-monopolistic sectors may be exempted by law, rather, 
only those acts that damage consumer interests. If competition is not 
allowed to enter into those sectors earlier excepted, then these same 
sectors will lose the opportunities afforded by competition, namely higher 
quality and lower costs. Finally, as I mentioned earlier, the Law must be 
receptive and responsive to the needs of a global economy; the Law must 
have effect beyond the borders of China. In short, China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law must involve economic monopoly, natural monopolies as they are 
understood by Western market economies, and administrative monopolies 
during the period of China’s economic transformation; and in addition, the 
Law must adapt to the WTO, and its rules should have clear international 
effects. 
III. MONOPOLISTIC AGREEMENTS 
The prohibition of monopolistic agreements is a core feature in anti-
monopoly law. The phrase “monopolistic agreement” refers to agreements 
whose purpose and effect is the restriction and elimination of competition 
within an enterprise. Essential to these agreements is collusion, whether 
written or not. Another characteristic of these agreements the coordination 
to restrict competition even when there is no clear indication of a 
monopoly. Monopolistic agreements reduce the vigor of market 
economies, and it is much more harmful than any other type of 
monopolistic act. In fact, the anti-monopoly agency more frequently deals 
with these agreements than other monopolistic acts. The ubiquity of these 
agreements requires that all nations restrict them in some way. 
 
 
 4. This issue is also referred to as the application of law exception.  
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The law does not prohibit all agreements that restrict competition; it 
depends on the agreement’s classification. Agreements are classified by 
their effect on competition. First, there are those that, by their nature and 
scope, violate the law regardless of the circumstances in which they occur. 
Common to these agreements are the serious harms they inflict upon 
market competition. Examples of these agreements are price cartels, 
quantity cartels, and oligarchies that partition the market. So as to limit the 
occurrence and effects of these agreements, China’s Anti-Monopoly law 
must make it illegal: (1) to enter collusive agreements directed toward 
maintaining or changing the prices of goods; (2) to limit the quantity of 
goods supplied to the market; (3) to restrain the purchase of new 
technology or new equipments; and (4) to jointly sell or purchase raw or 
compound materials. 
There is another classification of agreements that, depending on the 
circumstances in which they arise and their effects on competition may 
violate the law. Necessarily, the agreements must be examined ad hoc. An 
agreement that, while restrictive, nonetheless aids in the development of 
the economy as a whole should be exempted. This type of exemption is 
common throughout the world. Agreements that promote economic 
development or other public interests, such as improving technology, 
increasing productivity and efficiency, reducing production costs, 
consolidating the standards of production, encouraging the interrelation 
between production and markets would not violate the Law. Similarly, 
encouraging small and medium businesses to act in concert to improve 
operating efficiency, to strengthen competition, to change the face of the 
market, to maintain quality, to avoid overproduction, to rationalize 
management functions, and to foster the division or specialization of labor 
would not violate the Law. 
IV. ABUSE OF MARKET DOMINANCE 
Another core feature of anti-monopoly law is regulation of the market 
dominant position. Two legislative principles concern this regulation. The 
first is the “lower” legislative principle. It holds that anti-monopoly laws 
shall have an effect on the holder of the market dominant position only so 
long as the holder abuses such position in a way that results in the 
restriction of competition. Most countries, including Germany, Korea, 
Poland, Hungary, and Taiwan embrace this lower legislative principle. 
Opposed to the lower principle is the “higher” legislative principle. Based 
on this principle, when market dominance obtains, the State may dismiss 
and eliminate the dominant enterprise. Every enterprise is charged with the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/6
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obligation of declaring its dominant position to an anti-monopoly agency. 
The State, via the agency, first considers the anticompetitive effects, if 
any, that dominance has on the market in question; then the agency 
decides whether to break-up the enterprise. While both America and Japan 
have adopted the higher principle they have been careful in their 
examination of the market effects caused by market dominance, as well as 
the potential effects caused by the enterprise’s break-up. 
The developing trends of anti-monopoly indicate a greater willingness 
to regulate anticompetitive acts rather than mere market dominance. But in 
China the scope of the economy is inadequately developing, and an 
enterprise’s power to compete is lower. Furthermore, China’s current 
policy is to develop large enterprises and to group together small 
enterprises so as to encourage the growth of the scope of the economy. 
Consequently, China should embrace the lower legislative principle in 
order to adapt to international trends. In other words, China’s anti-
monopoly law should be primarily concerned with prohibiting the abuse of 
market dominant positions, not with preventing the achievement of such 
positions. The Law’s scope is not limited to prohibiting these abuses, 
however, it can also encourage competitive market structures, accelerate 
scope economy formation and development, and avoid monopoly after 
scope economy takes shape. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY 
“Administrative monopoly” occurs when the state and its agencies 
abuse their power in ways that restrict competition, and it is the product of 
the transformation from planned economy systems toward market 
economy systems. Administrative monopolies differ from economic 
monopolies in the subject, method, and purpose of the monopoly as well 
as the conditions in which they arise. The subject of the administrative 
monopoly is the state and its agencies; the method is abuse of 
administrative power. The purpose of an administrative monopoly is to 
benefit an agency or a particular local region. Because administrative 
monopolies have the apparent legitimacy of state sanction, they pose more 
harm than economic monopolies, and they are harder to regulate, to 
supervise, and to punish effectively. 
The regulation of administrative monopolies is arguably the most 
difficult task facing China’s anti-monopoly Law, and there are different 
opinions concerning how they should be regulated. Some believe that the 
existence of administrative monopoly is firmly embedded in the planned 
economy system and cannot be eliminated through regulation; instead, it 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may only be eradicated through political and economic reform. 
Historically, anti-monopoly legislation has regulated only economic 
monopoly and cannot effectively regulate administrative monopoly 
through simple, conceptual juxtaposition. Other scholars and policymakers 
disagree; they think the Law should regard administrative monopoly with 
particular emphasis. While they agree that administrative monopoly is the 
product of planned economy systems they see both administrative and 
economic monopoly as posing the same harms, the undesired limitation on 
competence and consumer benefit. Administrative monopoly strangles 
market economy systems, exterminates the vitality of economic 
development, and causes political corruption; in these ways administrative 
monopolies directly affect market competence. And because 
administrative monopolies are prominent in present-day China, the law 
must prohibit administrative monopoly or, at least, not neglect it. 
Administrative monopoly will not be eliminated by enactment of one 
Anti-Monopoly law. No, its elimination requires political and economic 
reform. But administrative monopolies often act in the same way as 
economic monopolies: they restrict competition, destroy competitive 
mechanisms of socialized market economies, and harm the legal interests 
of enterprises and consumers. And just as often administrative monopolies 
foster economic monopolies. Though administrative monopoly is a very 
serious problem, its regulation is not sufficiently systematic, authoritative, 
or operable. China will benefit from paying heed and drawing upon the 
experiences of Russia and other Eastern European countries, like Hungary 
and Bulgaria, which have faced the similar task of regulating 
administrative monopolies. 
VI. THE CONTROL OF OLIGOPOLY 
The term “oligopoly” refers to the exaggerated merging of economic 
powers, and the regulation of this phenomenon is a core feature of anti-
monopoly law. This feature has itself three characteristics. First, mergers 
can create joint enterprises but may also lead to market dominance, raise 
the costs associated to market entry, and reduce consumer benefit. The 
results of mergers are two-fold. On the one hand, the market contains only 
a few enterprises which can harmonize in price and quality. On the other 
hand, when an enterprise achieves a thirty-five percent market share, this 
“harmonization” can lead to price increases and quality of production and 
supply decreases. 
Second, most market economy systems have rules regulating mergers 
in order to avoid over-concentration and to retain competitive order. For 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/6
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example, America’s Clayton Act of 1914, Germany’s Restricting 
Competition Law, the European Union’s Merger Control Regulation, 
Japan’s Monopoly Prohibition Law, and Taiwan’s Fair Transaction Law. 
Only Hong Kong’s anti-monopoly law fails to regulate mergers. 
Regulating mergers is one of the three pillars of anti-monopoly law. 
Third, in the long run mergers can have the same effect as cartels. It is 
therefore unreasonable to regulate cartels but not mergers. Mergers can 
lead to an enterprise holding a market dominant position. Market 
dominance often leads to price and production controls, and it is very 
difficult to supervise enterprises holding these positions. Regulations 
aimed at preventing market dominance, as opposed to regulations aimed at 
remedying the effects caused by market dominance obtained, is therefore 
preferable. For example, the best method for regulating price is 
establishing competitive systems rather than price controls set ex post 
facto. Because mergers can enable the abuses of market dominance, China 
should regulate them. 
Some agencies and enterprises have shown their concern about 
mergers. They advocated the belief that regulation of oligopoly should be 
combined with the structural reform of large, state-owned enterprises. 
Presently, the merger laws do not apply—or apply with special 
exceptions—to the railway, civil aviation, and nuclear industries because 
of each industries specialization. Merger laws do not prevent the 
development of economies of scale, and they benefit enterprises by 
improving competitive ability. Economies of scale are not diametrically 
opposed to anti-monopoly law. First, except for natural monopolies, most 
enterprises realize economies of scale through the protection of anti-
monopoly laws. Second, the substantive laws of most countries do not 
restrict or prohibit or determine a given market’s economies of scale; 
instead, the substantive law prohibits monopolistic acts that exploit market 
advantage, gouge monopoly profits, and harm the State economy’s 
operation. However, the primacy of public interest and State economy 
must allow for some exceptions to the laws regulating oligopoly. 
VII. THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ENFORCEMENT AGENCY FOR THE ANTI-
MONOPOLY LAW 
There are three opinions about how to set up the anti-monopoly 
agency. First, there should be a special agency of enforcement which is 
independent and authoritative. Second, the present administrative agency 
should enforce the law. Third, a special agency, set up within the present 
administrative agency, should enforce the law. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Upon examining other countries’ experience, some general 
characteristics or principles become apparent. They are: legal agency, 
legal procedure, independence, and strict enforcement. Typical examples 
of these agencies include America’s Justice Department and Federal Trade 
Committee, Japan’s Fair Trade Committee, Germany’s Federal Economic 
Department and Competition Committee, and Russia’s Federal Anti-
Monopoly Agency. Although each agency has its own unique, national 
character, each of them is independent and capable to enforce the law 
effectively. 
In a word, anti-monopoly is important, but effective enforcement is 
more important. Mere legislation cannot create a fair and freely 
competitive market environment; such a creation requires an independent, 
highly efficient, authoritative anti-monopoly agency. In China, this agency 
must not only enforce the law against economic monopolies but 
administrative monopolies as well. Therefore, China must establish and 
effective and authoritative anti-monopoly agency in order to bestow upon 
the law legitimacy and integrity. 
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